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Abstract:
The post-Cartesian ‘material turn’ in management and organization 
studies understands that bodies are far more than vehicles that enable 
work to be undertaken, but are agentive actors in the constitution of 
work and working selves. This leads to the need for more empirically-
derived understanding of the agency of flesh in the performative 
corporealization of working, embodied selves. We met this challenge 





the materialities and materialization of working bodies. The study takes 
forward Judith Butler’s and Karen Barad’s theories of performativity by 
reading them through each other, and introducing flesh as an agentive 
actor in each moment-to-moment move. In paying close attention to the 
speech of supposedly ‘dumb flesh’ we show how flesh resists its negation 
and itself imposes control on the worker. We coin the term ‘body/flesh’ 
and illuminate how bodies are active and agentive, constituting 
corporeal/izing working selves in somewhat unexpected ways.
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Matter that embodies: 
Agentive flesh and working body/selves
Abstract
The post-Cartesian ‘material turn’ in management and organization studies understands 
that bodies are far more than vehicles that enable work to be undertaken, but are agentive 
actors in the constitution of work and working selves. This leads to the need for more 
empirically-derived understanding of the agency of flesh in the performative 
corporealization of working, embodied selves. We met this challenge through adapting 
feminist, posthuman research methods for a study of the materialities and materialization 
of working bodies. The study takes forward Judith Butler’s and Karen Barad’s theories of 
performativity by reading them through each other, and introducing flesh as an agentive 
actor in each moment-to-moment move. In paying close attention to the speech of 
supposedly ‘dumb flesh’ we show how flesh resists its negation and itself imposes control 
on the worker. We coin the term ‘body/flesh’ and illuminate how bodies are active and 
agentive, constituting corporeal/izing working selves in somewhat unexpected ways.
Keywords: Bodies, embodiment; working bodies; flesh; Judith Butler, Karen Barad, 
materialities, performativity.
Introduction
This paper explores the agency of flesh in the performative constitution of working 
bodies/selves. Such a task became possible only after Descartes’ long shadow was no 
longer cast over management and organization studies (MOS). The separation of mind 
and body was challenged successfully by social constructionist approaches that showed 

































































masculine minds did not transcend male bodies and women were not inferior because of 
their supposed immanence to essentialized female flesh (e.g. Witz, 2000; Alcoff, 2013).  
Grosz (1994, p.x) is perhaps germinal. Bodies, she wrote, ‘cannot be adequately 
understood as historical, precultural, or natural objects in any simple way; they are not 
only inscribed, marked, engraved, by social pressures external to them but are the 
products, the direct effects of the very constitution of nature itself’. Note the reference to 
bodies as ‘direct effects’ and thus somehow passive places for inscription. Sinclair (2005, 
p. 92) similarly praised feminism’s influence in rejecting concepts of bodies as ‘bundles 
of bone, muscle and organ’ and understanding them ‘as culturally constructed or 
constituted’ (but note, not agentive). A body of theory running from Hassard, Holliday 
and Willmott’s (2000) edited collection, book-marked by reviews in Kupers (1995) and 
Gartner (2013), integrated embodiment into comprehending organizations’ operations, 
while Acker’s (1990) influential work emphasised understanding the organization of 
bodies at work. These broadly constructionist or phenomenological perspectives 
understood bodies as having a material base (‘the body’) upon which meaning was made 
possible through discourses. 
Judith Butler’s (1990; 1993) ground-breaking texts argued body’s ‘matter’ or materiality 
is itself constructed: there is no body prior to the discourses through which it emerges. 
Poststructuralist interpretations thus rejected concepts of bodies as more or less passive 
matter onto which are inscribed social and cultural discourses (Styhre, 2005). Hockey and 
Allen-Collinson’s (2009) call for more phenomenological, embodied and ‘fleshy’ studies 
of workplace embodiment signalled a move towards, and development of, increasingly 
rich poststructural theories of bodies/embodiment in MOS.  This included analyses of 

































































bodies’ materialization through ‘body work’ (Swan & Flowers, 2017), disciplining 
through managerial practices requiring conformity with certain (imagined) expectations 
(Rajan-Rankin, 2018), involvement in sense-making (Cunliffe & Coupland, 2012), and as 
foundational to organizational ethics (Dale & Latham, 2015; Phillips, Pullen & Rhodes, 
2014). Hindmarsh and Pilnick (2007) analyzed how organizational members make sense 
of and orient to others’ embodied conduct at work, while Fotaki and Harding (2017) 
explored embodiment as experiential resistance. Gatrell (2008) and Bevan and Gatrell 
(2017) showed there is much to resist: female bodies appear as career-inhibiting, always-
already pregnant ‘maternal bodies’ (Gatrell, 2008). 
With regard to working bodies, Yates, Riach and Johansson’s (2018) study of police 
officers’ broken bodies illuminated work’s influence on how bodies are experienced, 
although academic’s working bodies have perhaps been most studied. Probyn (2010, in 
Gherardi, 2019, p.217) emphasised the embodied nature of academic work. We work 
ideas through our bodies; we write through our bodies, hoping to get into the bodies of 
our readers, and our academic bodies are on display while we teach (Sinclair, 2005; Bell 
& Sinclair, 2014). Academics’ disembodied approach to writing was attacked for its 
complicity in perpetuating economic, political, social and cultural disparities and 
inequalities (Pullen, 2018), and for constituting oppressive organizational hierarchies and 
allied academic practices (Höpfl, 2007; Helin, 2015; Pullen, 2006). Remedies were 
sought through ‘writing from the body’ (Phillips, Pullen & Rhodes, 2014; Fotaki, Metcalf 
& Harding, 2014; Gilmore, Harding, Helin & Pullen, 2019).

































































Poststructural approaches are now merging into posthuman accounts of embodiment, 
influenced greatly by Barad’s (2007) insistence on non-sentient actors’ agency. 
Posthuman theories challenge poststructuralism’s neglect of materialities while retaining 
understanding of the constitutive work of discourses. Haraway (1988, p.595), whose 
work transcends the periodization of this review, envisaged bodies as ‘material-semiotic 
generative node[s] [whose] boundaries materialize in social interaction’. Her observation 
(1990, p.222) that bodies are ‘maps of power and identity’ anticipated posthuman 
understanding of bodies as agentive, material actors (Gruber, 2019). Here, bodies are not 
just pieces of meat awaiting enlivenment by an agentive mind, but are constituted through 
performative acts in which material flesh and discourses of bodies are intertwined. 
Bennett (2010) theorizes a vitality intrinsic to materiality as such, detaching materiality 
from ‘the figures of passive, mechanistic, or divinely infused substance’ (2010, p.xiii), so 
that bodies’ matter plays a direct part in the worlding of the world. In Braidotti’s (2013) 
terms, the (posthuman) body is neither biological nor sociological but a point of overlap 
for the sociological, symbolic and material, a transversal materiality always in movement 
and always becoming. Gherardi (2019, p.42) recently suggested the shift towards 
posthumanism requires understanding of bodies as ‘composed of multiple and divergent 
potentialities emerging in the body's encounter with other bodies in a process of 
differentiation of the body itself’. This ‘posthuman material turn’ intrigued us and 
inspired the study on which this paper is based. We ask: how could agentive flesh ‘world 
the world of work’? Indeed, what are ‘bodies’ and what is ‘flesh’? We confront below 
our own, too-easy slippage between these terms.

































































Answering the question of how agentive flesh worlds the world of work is fraught with 
challenges. Our brief history of bodies/embodiment in MOS glosses over the issue that 
bodies, as vital, sensory, material and ephemeral intensities exceed language (Butler, 
2015). Their ‘vast quantity of sensations, movements, reactions, and affects’ that are 
often ‘unrepresentable’ (Merchant, 2011, p.58), both exceed comprehension and 
influence thought in ways not understood (Hester, 2005). They are at the boundaries of 
knowledge. What is it, then, that is written about in the studies cited above?  Could Butler 
somehow be in error and is there a way of approaching the matter of bodies through 
language? Or is there a way in which it is possible to translate flesh’s ‘speech’ into 
words? These are the questions that stimulated the study we report on here, whose aim 
was to explore the agency of flesh in the performative constitution of working bodies. 
The planning of this study was influenced by posthuman theory that thinks from the 
borders of speakability. Waterton and Yusoff (2017), for example, recommend 
approaching embodiment through conceptualizing bodies not as bounded entities but as 
assemblages and processes. Springgay and Truman (2017) draw on ‘transcorporeality’ to 
posit that humans and non-humans are enmeshed in a messy, shifting ontology: bodies 
are ‘situated realities of historical and spatial sedimentations of power’. Bodies become 
regarded as permeable (Bosworth, 2016), indeterminate (Gruber, 2019; Waterton 
&Yusoff, 2017), entangled in becoming (Barad, 2007), and fleshy (Binkley, 2018). Such 
approaches provide little guidance on carrying out posthuman empirical research. 
Thanem and Knights (2019) describe the complexities of bodies, that they are ‘never 
merely physical’ (p.3), but their advice on doing embodied research is already exceeded 

































































by posthuman approaches. Intra-acting entanglements of matter and its individuation as 
bodies and organs is philosophically insightful but empirically daunting. 
We overcome these hindrances through building on our previous work that combines 
Judith Butler’s and Karen Barad’s theories of performativity (Ford, Harding, Gilmore & 
Richardson, 2017; Harding, Ford & Lee, 2017). We suggested that where Butler (1990; 
1993) helps understand the constitution of subjects through moment-to-moment 
performative movements, Barad (2007) provides means of studying each of those 
constitutive moments. However, we explored material presence but not the matter of 
bodies. We saw potential in developing our earlier approach by inserting flesh into each 
moment of the performative, to understand flesh’s agency in the constitution of working 
bodies. By ‘flesh’ we mean the physical matter of bodies – skin, blood, bones, hair, fat, 
organs, etc. - not as passive substance but as ‘a sentient, sensural and sensible ensemble 
of materialized capacities and agency that literally and figurally makes sense of, and to, 
both ourselves and others’ (Sobchack, 2004, p.2). This led us to realise the falsity of the 
distinction between ‘flesh’ and ‘bodies’ and we collapsed them into the neologism  
‘body/flesh’. The ‘body’ part of this term refers to the corporeal seat of the ego, onto 
which is inscribed cultural meaning (Butler, 2015), and ‘flesh’ refers to the matter that 
materialises as ‘my body’ (Barad, 2007). In what follows we show how that intervening 
slash, ‘/’, marks a false, agential cut (Barad, 2007). 
In summary, in the relatively short history of studies of bodies/embodiment in MOS, the 
matter of bodies once jettisoned, its flesh left clinging to the raft of discourse, returns in 
posthuman theory. Bodies become conceptualized as material/discursive agentive flesh, 
body/flesh. This leads to the study we discuss here, that contributes an empirically-

































































supported understanding of body/flesh’s agency in the performative constitution of the 
corporeal(izing) working self. Its second contribution is a development of theories of 
performativity arising from inserting agentive body/flesh into Butler’s and Barad’s 
theories of performativity and reading them diffractively through each other.
We next outline the paper’s theoretical location, in Butler’s and Barad’s work, before 
discussing the feminist methodology of our empirical study of the corporeal(izing) 
working ‘I’. 
Philosophical location 
Van Maanen writes that choice of theoretical or philosophical location is subjective rather 
than rational, resting ‘as much on taste as on fit’ (van Maanen, 2011, p.233). We are 
drawn to Butler’s and Barad’s theories of performativity because they offer insightful and 
innovative ways of interpreting organizational life. Butler’s approach is influential within 
MOS, notable examples including Tyler and Cohen’s (2008) analysis of ‘spaces that 
matter’, Riach, Rumens and Tyler’s (2014; 2016) forging of new approaches to empirical 
research, Rittenhofer and Gatrell’s (2012) critique of dominant teleological and binary 
thinking within academia and, particularly, Tyler’s (2020) development of a Butlerian 
theory of work. Barad, in taking forward Butler’s theory of performativity, emphasizes 
materialities. It is increasingly evident in MOS in studies such as Orlikowski and Scott 
(2015) and Hultin and Mahring (2016). In this paper we build upon earlier work in which 
we attempted to reconcile the two approaches (Ford et al, 2017; Harding et al, 2017).
We first outline Butler’s theory of performativity, augmenting it with a less familiar text 
concerning the matter of bodies (Butler, 2015). We then describe Barad’s approach, 

































































before discussing our merger of aspects of the two that provides the theoretical location 
for our analysis of flesh’s agency in the performative constitution of working bodies. 
Butler’s influential theory of performativity argued that gender has ‘no ontological status 
apart from the very acts which constitute its reality’ (1990, p.136). Those acts consist of 
micro-movements that ‘constitute the illusion of an abiding gendered self’ (1990, p.140): 
one ‘becomes a subject through performativity, which is not an act, nor a performance, 
but constantly repeated ‘acts’ that reiterate norms’ (Butler, 1993, p.12; 240 ff.). This 
repetition is not performed by, but enables, the subject. Governed by norms, 
performativity occurs within and through discourses. That is, ‘the subject who speaks is 
also constituted by the language that she or he speaks, [so] language is the condition of 
possibility for the speaking subject, and not merely its instrument of expression’ (1997a, 
p.28). The body, Butler argued (1993, p.13), is not a ‘mere instrument or medium for 
which a set of cultural meanings are only externally related, but is itself a construction’. 
Performativity thus challenges a metaphysics that presumes categories are culturally 
constructed, and undermines ontological effects that bring into being various realities 
(Butler, 2010, p.147) 
Feminists thinkers such as Alcoff (2006) and Colebrook (2008) argued Butler’s work 
ignored the indissociability of matter and discourse. They charged her with failing to link 
bodies’ materialization to social and economic structures, and of conforming with 
poststructuralism’s refusal to acknowledge some form of ‘real’ beyond discourse. An 
intriguing philosophical debate developed, too broad to summarise here (see Jagger, 
2015). Butler’s response was publication in 2015 of a collection of essays exploring 
bodies’ matter/ing. 

































































This later text argues it is difficult to discuss bodies’ physical matter because philosophy 
flounders ‘time and again on the question of the body, it tends to separate what is called 
thinking from what is called sensing, from desire, passion, sexuality, and relations of 
dependency’ (p.15). Locating this failure in Descartes’ influence, she draws on a 
formidable array of philosophers to ponder matter’s participation in the ‘I’s’ formation. 
Her text illuminates a palpable struggle to represent matter: it can be attempted only 
through that language which it exceeds (an aporia that haunts our analysis below). 
Butler’s focus in thes  essays is upon how matter, materialities, discourses and norms 
facilitate the on-going, reiterated emergence of an embodied self. ‘Touch’ is fundamental, 
as we now summarise.
The sea of sensations that is the very young baby (Klein, 2006) becomes individuated, an 
‘I’, Butler argues, through ‘touching/being touched’ by/with/within enmeshment in 
matrices of sentient and non-sentient others. In babyhood ‘we feel things, undergo 
impressions, prior to forming any thoughts, including any thoughts we might have about 
ourselves’ (p.2) (there is as yet no “I” that could have those thoughts). Through these 
‘impressions’ the “I” emerges. In other words, flesh founds the subject, the ‘I’ or ‘me’. 
These early fleshy experiences of being ‘impressed upon’ remain with us, ever recurring, 
for ‘I am not formed once and definitively, but continuously or repeatedly. I am still 
being formed as I form myself in the here and now’ (p.6). 
Most insightful for our study is Butler’s interrogation of Merleau-Ponty and Spinoza. The 
former facilitates discussion of how touch first animates the subject, awakening the 
senses and making possible a ‘sentient apprehension of the world’ (p.8). Relations with 
multiple others ‘form a matrix for subject formation’ where touching/being touched 

































































almost literally ‘impresses’ norms and discourses on the flesh of the individuating 
subject. From Spinoza comes insights regarding how bodies individuate – apparent 
occupancy of a bounded body determines at whom the scene of address as a ‘you’ is 
directed, but this is a misapprehension, Butler argues. The body cannot be singular as it 
exists only through the agency of ‘technologies, structures, institutions, an array of others 
both personally and impersonally related, organic and life processes’ (p. 14). There is 
thus no individual(ized) body. Similarly, body and language are not separate and distinct: 
the ‘great deal of bodily signifying that happens prior to vocalization and speech’ 
continues alongside vocalization: the body continues to ‘talk’, to signify (p.15). 
These essays explore matter’s matter/ing within each iterative, performative moment. 
Norms and discourses that govern subjects’ formation are apprehended in the psyche and 
language and also, crucially, through bodies’ very matter. That matter is stamped with 
norms and discourses; they are embedded within and are part of it. Flesh ‘speaks’ as it 
were, although in a language not accessible to conscious thought or through words 
(bodies exceed what is speakable within language). This takes us to Baradian 
performativity. 
Barad (2007) aimed to make good Butler’s apparent omission of matter. ‘A rigorous 
materialist theory of the body’, she writes (Barad 2007, p.93, quoting Hennessey, 1993) 
‘cannot stop with the assertion that the body is always discursively constructed. It also 
needs to explain how the discursive construction of the body is related to non-discursive 
practices …’. Barad locates the roots of Butler’s (presumed) eradication of the matter of 
bodies to her engagement with Foucault’s analytic of power that similarly ignored the 
intimate relationships between discursive and non-discursive practices. Barad aimed to 

































































redress that failure through introducing to performativity a theory of how material forces 
(including the body’s anatomy and physiology) ‘actively matter to the process of 
materialization’ (Barad, 2007, p.65). 
Where Butler pointed to moment-to-moment moves that performatively constitute a 
subject, Barad (2007), influenced by quantum mechanics and Donna Haraway’s work, 
uses Butlerian performativity theory ‘as a diffraction grating’ for reading feminist/queer 
texts and science studies through one another to propose ‘a materialist and posthumanist 
reworking of the notion of performativity’ (Barad, 2007, p.811).
That is, where Butler pointed to the ongoing iteration of performative moments, Barad 
(2007) seeks to discern entangled material agencies’ ‘intra-actions’ (not ‘inter-actions’ 
because ‘interacting’ implies two separate and distinguishable entities) within that 
moment. The performative is ‘intra-actions that reconstitute entanglements’ (p.74). 
‘Entanglements’ references that inseparability of mutually informative subsystems 
(p.283) that intra-act. ‘Matter’ agentively participates; it is produced and productive, 
generated and generative; agentive and not fixed essence or property.
In Barad’s thesis there are no boundaries between entities, only what appear to be 
boundaries and separate(d) entities. Rather than envisaging distinctions between entities, 
such as, say, body and shoes, they are blurred at the edges, bleeding into and participating 
in each other’s performative constitution. Foot and shoes meanwhile intra-act with other 
entities, each of which bleeds into all others around it, and is bled into in its turn.  Thus, 
shoes’ leather and dye’s chemicals, shoe-maker, factory and shoe-shop, shop assistant, 
discourses of labour and of ‘the female’, all collude at the site of ‘the’ shoe that, when 
worn, constitutes the wearer as ‘woman’, caught up and entangled within discourses and 

































































materialities of sex, bodies, laws, time, space, and fashion.  Thus, Barad’s extension of 
Butler’s work brings to performativity theory the possibility of understanding how 
materialities, intra-acting within discourses and space and time in each iterative, 
performative moment, constitute (in our example) ‘body’, ‘embodiment’ and ‘woman’.
We here build on and develop our earlier diffractive reading of these two theories (Ford 
et al, 2017; Harding et al, 2017). Diffractive readings (Barad, 2007) permit use of 
seemingly incommensurate philosophical perspectives – ideas can be productively 
bounced off each other. Ford et al (2017) and Harding et al (2017) bring Butler’s focus on 
power, lacking from Barad’s account, into Barad’s facility to glimpse intricate 
entanglements occurring in each performative moment. This facilitates insights into the 
micro-movements of the performative, where there is inseparability of all ‘things’: 
everything is constituted within and through its intra-actions with numerous other 
‘things’. 
In many ways flesh, but not bodies, remains formless, perhaps necessarily, for meaning 
may be imposed only retrospectively (Butler, 2015), after apprehending a presence. 
However, some grasp is needed of what we refer to when mentioning the ‘flesh’ that has 
agency in the constitution of working bodies, what we call ‘body/flesh’. Most directly, 
flesh includes the ‘vulva, vagina and labia’ discussed by Pullen (2018) as a metaphor for 
writing, but also the ‘subcutaneous fat’ described in Mol’s (2002, p.147) description of a 
surgical operation. More elusively, it is that which experiences the racing pulse and sense 
of terror when immersed in a film, that is often absent from thought (Leder, 1990), but 
makes itself felt when sick or injured (Scary, 1987). It is that which is missing from 
indices of books exploring bodies as symbols (Bolso, Svendsen & Sorensen, 2018) for 

































































there’s nothing symbolic about flesh: it intervenes, gurgles, embarrasses, it makes life 
possible and ultimately, its precarity ends individual life. It may be visible (e.g. skin) or 
invisible (e.g. organs). It is radically materialist (Sobchack, 2004), existing ‘provisionally 
both as a permeable, shifting physical perimeter, a limbic surround of virtual 
containment, and as the visible trace of the human body’ (Jones, 1998, cited in Sobchack, 
2004, p. 99).  It is both metaphorically and materially an envelope that inscribes the 
demarcation between inside and outside but also the site of their joining (ibid). It is, in 
short, something that both exists inside and outside of language, that is separate from the 
‘I’ who might claim it as ‘my’ property, ‘my’ flesh, while concurrently an intrinsic part of 
that ‘I’.  We aimed in our study to develop some understanding of this illusive materiality 
that is both always there (for without it there is no ‘I’) and always not-there. 
In summary, we aimed to understand the agency of flesh in the performative constitution 
of corporeal(izing) working bodies through inserting flesh into performative moments 
made apprehendable through combining Butler’s (1991; 1993) and Barad’s (2007) 
theories of performativity. We needed a methodology for identifying the mattering of 
matter in performative, iterative moments in which flesh moves, feels, thinks, discourses, 
occupies space, experiences time, senses, is afflicted and affected. This is discussed next. 
Methodology and methods
Understanding of flesh’s involvement in performative moments is inaccessible via 
interviews – it requires deep, phenomenological insights apprehended through intense 
analysis of bodies’ moment-to-moment moves (Merleau-Ponty, 1962). We overcame 
these methodological difficulties by utilizing feminist approaches to memory work in 
which a research collective (1) recalls instances of specific events and (2) explores them 

































































in recursive rounds of communal interrogation (Haug et al. 1987). Davies and Gannon 
(2006), labelling this ‘collective biography’, describe it as an ethical, reflexive research 
practice used to ‘write and reflect on moments of being, on the ambivalent, slippery 
subject-in-process …. captured in the remembered moment of being’ (p.x, emphasis in 
original). This facilitates an onto-epistemological mapping of performative moments in 
which something new emerges (Davies & Gannon, 2006, p.2). It conforms with Barad’s 
(2007, p.129) insistence on research apparatus’ agency. In our study our bodies, our 
body/flesh, are both research apparatus and that which is researched. 
This posthuman methodological approach aligns with our theoretical location. It rebels 
against the disciplinary and normative constraints of ‘textbook’ approaches to qualitative 
methods (Lather, 2013), to engage with language’s materiality, its force and 
entanglements in bodies and matter.  It critiques representation as the dominant image of 
thought, preferring a ‘flattened’ logic that renders words incapable of standing in for ‘the 
world’. There cannot be a critical, intentional subject standing separate from or outside 
what has conventionally been called ‘the data’. Indeed, ‘data’ can no longer be regarded 
as ‘an inert and indifferent mass waiting to be in/formed and calibrated by our analytic 
acumen or our coding systems’ (MacLure, 2013, pp. 660-661); rather data moves 
researchers to ‘somewhere unpredictable’. 
Given our focus on the corporeal(izing) working body, and needing to use ourselves as 
our research instruments, we chose to focus on ourselves doing our own academic work.  
Our next dilemma was: which aspects of the array of work we do would give best 
insights into the corporeal(izing) of our enfleshed academic selves? 
We found inspiration in Stern’s (2004) methodology of moments, that complements 

































































performativity theories because it involves recall of experiences lasting only seconds. Un-
narrated at the moment of experience, the present instant of recall brings them into 
language for analysis. Combining collective biography and methodology of moments, we 
asked each other: ‘Can you remember occasions while working when you became acutely 
aware of your body?’ This resolved the problem of which aspects of our work to analyze: 
the evoked memories made that choice for us. In becoming our own objects of study, our 
narratives allow speaking about transgressive acts otherwise kept hidden (Parker-Fuller, 
2000: 26), invaluable in our mutual interrogations about times of being shocked into 
sudden awareness of our bodies. It facilitated ‘bricolage of a fragmented consciousness, a 
body of knowledge and a way of knowing that spring not from something imposed from 
outside but from what is rooted within’ (Kuhn, 1995, p.708), and helped articulate the 
almost unspeakable.  It assists in understanding lived embodied experiences (Wacquant, 
2014), surfaces self-reflections on bodies’ materialities (Brewis & Sinclair, 2000), and 
ensures everyday experiences of lived practices form the basis for knowledge (Onyx & 
Small, 2001). Collective biography and bricolage (Levi-Strauss, 1962) have similarities. 
Each offers ways of exploring experiences sensitively and iteratively. The bricolage 
process adds depth to collective biography through ‘dialogue’ in which actors collect and 
review individual and joint ‘repertoires’ (Levi-Strauss, 1962) consisting of material 
objects, memories, embodied responses – anything that assists the research. 
That account glosses over the repeated rounds of intense discussions during the data 
analysis process, that is:
Round One: short-listing the most insightful remembered moments. Each researcher 
wrote a detailed account of ‘their’ remembered moment;

































































Round Two: group interrogation of each remembered moment. For example, the 
Ethnographer’s sense of shock: we asked: what is in the room? What were you wearing? 
How far above your face was the mirror? Describe the mirror. Were you wearing make-
up? What did it feel like not to be wearing make-up? Etc. Very rich descriptions 
emerged; 
Round Three: turning each vignette into a play that imagined what non-sentient actors 
would say if they could speak. For example, the Consultant’s account became a play in 
two Acts, in which furniture, clothes, arms, legs, sweat glands, all were given imaginary 
lines; (See the analysis for a brief example);
Round Four: these very rich descriptions facilitated our immersing ourselves in deep 
engagement with what our flesh was ‘doing’ in the remembered moment. We asked: what 
is your flesh saying to you – translate its sense-making into words.  For example, the 
Autoethnographer described both how boxing gloves, bench and bus seat felt against her 
hands and legs, and their moment-to-moment intra-actions with those objects; 
Round Five: theory development. We asked: how does Butler/Barad explain this? 
Throughout we made copious notes, sometimes breaking off to ask what bodies and flesh 
were experiencing as they made those notes. 
Round Six: this later round involved responding to reviewers, who we positioned as new 
interrogators. We identified the over-influence of some readings and our deafness to 
others.  
This exhaustive approach requires open-mindedness and trust. Analysis was recursive: 
the chosen elements were ‘recast’ through the lens of the emergent theory. Different 
facets of each remembered moment emerged over time – faces, arms, legs making their 

































































presence felt, and sensations of flesh behind and beyond body parts peeking through. 
Eventually these collapsed into body/flesh.
Throughout we aimed to remain cognizant of posthuman research’s requirement ‘to 
engage more fully with the materiality of language itself – the fact that language is in and 
of the body; always issuing from the body; being impeded by the body; affecting other 
bodies yet also, of course, ‘always leaving the body, becoming immaterial, ideational, 
representational, a striated, collective, cultural and symbolic resource’ in an intra-acting 
‘collective space’ (MacLure, 2013, pp.663-4). This took the form, here, of an organic 
writing process in which our accounts emerged, evolved and, eventually, became frozen 
in the final draft, to which we now turn. We begin with the Ethnographer’s account, 
before discussing the Consultant’s and finally the Autoethnographer’s.   
Analysing the repertoires 
The first explores an experience when body/flesh made itself present during fieldwork.  
The Ethnographer’s absent-minded body. 
It is my first day of field-work at the football club. I am all alone, sitting in the canteen at 
the training ground drinking a cup of tea, waiting for their Performance Coach so we can 
progress my work. The daily training session is taking place and I can hear muffled 
sounds of shouting, the thud of the ball and laughter. Suddenly the door leading to the 
practice pitches opens and the players swarm into the previously deserted area. There 
are about 15 or so of them but it feels like they are legion. They are tall, many of them 
over 6ft and they physically exude strength and confidence. There’s a smell of grass, of 
outdoors and sweat; the silence is replaced by boisterous joking and loud conversations. 
I feel my own body contract and I gasp with shock as I am sharply aware that I am their 

































































polar opposite and I contract into my own sex, my own self. 
Butler provided the key to understanding this incident, by way of her reference (2015, pp. 
2-3) to a Nietzschean aphorism: ‘the bell that has “boomed … the twelve beats of noon” 
startles the self-reflective person who only afterwards rubs their ears and, “surprised and 
disconcerted” asks, “what really was that which we have just experienced?”’ This 
‘surprise’, she writes, is a reliving of a foundational experience of infancy: recognition of 
being an ‘I’ rather than an entity merged with its caregiver. Such ‘incipient passages’ 
(p.4) recur throughout life, through what Freud called Nachträglichkeit (Freud, 1895) or 
the revision and later reworking of experiences, impressions and memory traces that are 
felt to be difficult or traumatic. The Ethnographer, lost in thoughts and summoned rudely 
out of them, re-experiences that early shock of self-recognition – as an ‘I’ who emerges 
into/within/through norms that precede and exceed her, that both subject (govern) and 
subjectify (constitute the subject as an ‘I’) (Butler, 1997).
Before that sudden awakening to consciousness in the canteen, body/flesh sits, absent 
from self-awareness (Leder, 1990). It moves (drinks tea) without conscious thought. 
There is no ‘I’, only body/flesh moving in space. The invasion of a ‘swarm’ of men 
summons self-awareness. The space-invaders effect the Ethnographer’s surprised and 
shocked jolt out of absent-bodied reverie into a corporeal self that, self-aware, can narrate 
an account of herself as ‘me’. 
Butler’s (2015) glossing of Merleau-Ponty’s work (2015), diffracted through Barad’s 
concept of entangled intra-actions, helps us peer into body/flesh’s agency in this 
performative moment. Merleau-Ponty understood flesh as a web enmeshed within other 
complex webs of (what Barad would identify as) intra-actions with other flesh: flesh 

































































touches. Without touch, Butler argues, ‘there is no object, no elsewhere, no outside’ 
(p.47) and no ‘I’. ‘Touch’ here is not the material contact of bodies but a ‘tactility that 
exceeds any given touch’ (p.36): flesh touches flesh through affect. Affect here is the 
electric charge of energy occasioned by the invasion of young, ebullient male bodies. 
Body/flesh’s sensorium registers and responds to that energy, agentively acting within all 
the entangled intra-actions of that performative moment (Barad, 2007) when the 
Ethnographer was summoned into self-awareness. That which she experiences as her 
flesh/body extends outside itself and touches those other bodies and theirs touch hers. 
Where mind had been absent from body/flesh moving without conscious volition, the 
agency of flesh touching flesh summons ‘the mind’ and sense of self. 
Seeing, touch and language intra-act in Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology (Butler, 2015). 
He collapses distinctions between subjects and objects, and ‘the perceiving “I” acquires a 
flesh that implicates him or her in a world of flesh’ (Butler, 2015, p.162). This heralds a 
second moment in The Ethnographer’s account, involving the eyes’ performative agency.   
Friday morning. It has been a long week. I’ve just finished a gym workout with two 
footballers and their coach.  I’m exhausted. There are no suitable shower facilities for me 
at the training ground, only hand basins in the women’s toilets. I lower my face to the 
bowl, wash away the sweat, rinse off the soap and bury my head in the towel. Dry again, 
I catch my reflection in the mirror above the sink. I do not see what I had expected to see. 
It is me but it is somehow not the me whose reflection I had anticipated. What gazes back 
at me is a recognizably female face. I have been working with men all week, and I had 
somehow forgotten what face I would see in the mirror. I do not know what I expected to 
see, only know that I was shocked and puzzled by the reflection. 

































































The first four statements of the ‘I’ in this account enact flesh/body’s speaking about itself, 
as flesh, blood, bone, skin and aching muscles that move to the hand basin; it washes 
itself without, it seems, conscious propulsion. The mind is again absent from body/flesh 
that, exhausted, and turned in on that exhaustion, needs to clean itself. We see again how 
the ‘I’ is instigated. In Butlerian terms (2015, p.52) body/flesh that moves without 
conscious propulsion is a ‘point of departure for sentience’. That departure point here is a 
glimpsed reflection. Barad helps explain the puzzle of how the reflection represents 
(takes on the representation of) ‘me, a woman’ as mind plummets into what had been, 
literally, absent-minded body/flesh. 
Barad’s ‘posthuman performative approach’ (2007, p.135) in which language and 
materials are entangled and neither given precedence, incorporates the optical. Physical 
boundaries that seemingly carve out distinct entities are rejected: attention turns to 
understanding how boundaries (here that between female and male) appear to appear.  To 
paraphrase Holmes and Jones’s (2016) analysis of how eyes distinguishes handles from 
doors, a ‘commotion’ of texts, images and materialities unfolded into and onto each other 
assault sight. We learn in infancy how to disentangle and name them: we acquire the 
skills of distinguishing that bump that is given the name ‘nose’ from the bumps we learn 
to call ‘ears’. Throughout life, that subtle, unthought skill we forget we had needed to 
acquire untangles shapes, identifies some as skin, others as lips, teeth, etc. That is, 
‘objects’ are not given directly to the eye: the eye learns in infancy to dis-cern shapes, 
distinguish one from another, and apply appropriate labels. This boundary-making work 
distinguishes bodies and bodies’ parts, and ‘male’ and ‘female’. 

































































The Ethnographer, surrounded all week by masculine bodies, had, it seems, seen herself 
in their image, forgetting her own face’s representation until it, literally, re-appeared in 
the mirror. Barad asks ‘Can we trust visual delineations to define bodily boundaries? Can 
we trust our eyes?’ (2007, p.377). The Ethnographer’s experience answers: eyes are 
boundary-making apparatuses that carve out difference. The mirror is an active agent that 
touches body/flesh; body/flesh becomes understood, in a flash, as ‘me’. In that moment 
body/flesh makes meaning first, and conscious, reflective thought follows (Sobchack, 2004, 
p. 59). In one micro-performative moment gender-less body/flesh is re-cognized, the mind 
returns, and a sentient female appears in front of the mirror. 
This first repertoire shows body/flesh in the performative moment as the point of departure 
for sentience and evocation of the ‘I’.
The Consultant’s struggle to control body/flesh
I have been an academic for 23 years and before that a manager, latterly at board level. 
Why then do I have a fear of being caught out and found wanting when delivering 
workshops to managers? I prepare meticulously for this particular workshop. I dress 
with care in a black sleeveless dress and black and white tailored jacket and smart black 
shoes that instantly make me feel business-like and professional. I start to feel much more 
the part as even my hair and makeup pull together to complete the look of someone who 
knows what she is doing. Once I’m in the room and the equipment set up and working I 
start to relax into my role of knowledgeable expert. I feel myself filling out my tailored 
jacket, adopting what I sense is a masculine position. I’m disguising as many of the 
signifiers of the female as I am aware of but as the day wears on and the room becomes 
warmer, I’m itching to remove my jacket to try to cool down. Even opening the tiny 

































































boardroom windows makes no difference and I am really overheating. But I just can’t 
entertain the idea of taking off my jacket and exposing my bare arms and fleshy batwings 
to the executive team. It would expose me – not only as a female and an impostor in this 
masculine subject position but also would show my wobbly biceps and triceps. I have to 
suffer the heat and keep my jacket intact.
We start in the bedroom-space. A Cartesian ontology would imply there is a consultant 
choosing clothes and a suit awaiting wearing but Barad’s agentive realism understands 
that neither pre-exists the active, on-going entanglements of actants (Higgings, 2016). 
Barad (2007 p. 170) writes: ‘Bodies do not simply take their place in the world … rather 
“environments” and “bodies” are intra-actively constituted’. In this private space the 
body appears initially as transport for the assemblage of materials whose agency sets in 
motion ‘the consultant’. Note the use of pronouns in the fourth sentence: the eye who 
feels ‘much more the part’ is passive, acted upon by hair and make-up that ‘pull together’ 
without, it seems, the Consultant’s active participation. A ‘she’ emerges lacking the ‘I’s’ 
nervousness. Body/flesh is disguised, hidden by clothes and other materials. To 
paraphrase Butler’s (2015, p.28) interrogation of Descartes, there can be no worker 
without body/flesh, but the individuating ‘consultant’ negates that body/flesh, covering it 
over, making its corporeal reality invisible. The Consultant is, at other times, an athlete 
who runs long distances every week. While running, we speculate, the ‘she’ that knows 
what it is doing is the well-toned, disciplined and honed running body/flesh-itself. The 
Consultant is its opposite, obeying a general organizational interdiction against 
body/flesh, as we see next. 

































































In the boardroom’s public space, body/flesh makes itself known. The space is constituted 
as rational (hard wooden table, upright chairs, closed off from nature) and thus masculine 
public space (Brewis et al., 1997). The room, it seems, demands that its occupants collude 
in the construction of a professional space – even though the men present took off their 
jackets, they did not loosen their ties, those phallolinear marks that signify ‘organization’. 
We originally thought the history entangled within this account is of public space where 
women are still interlopers (Benn & Gauss, 1983): revealing her body/flesh as female 
would transgress masculine/rational organizational space and undo the Consultant. But 
reviewers’ words kept taking us back to the men in the boardroom. Our feminist 
interpretation may still hold, but something exceeds it.
We cannot know how the men present experienced that situation, but the Consultant 
recalls that they too were hot (they took off their jackets). Can it be therefore that the law 
requiring The Consultant keep her body/flesh hidden applies also to male body/flesh? 
That is, is all body/flesh taboo in organizations? A moment’s observation suggests it is: 
male body/flesh is covered from just below the chin, seemingly negated, by suit, tie, 
uniforms, overalls. Women’s body/flesh is leaky (Shildrick, 2015; Trethewey, 1999), but 
men’s body/flesh also; it is a pretence to affect it is not, a pretence that needs 
interrogating (see Riach & Warren, 2015). If men must transcend their body/flesh and 
women are barred for being body/flesh/nature, then it is body/flesh, male and female, that 
must be hidden: body/flesh is taboo in organizations. If so, then organizational rationality 
and attendant professional norms rest on the negation of body/flesh – to Trethewey’s 
(1999) account of the disciplinary norms faced by professional women workers we add 
that men too appear disciplined by similar norms.

































































Body/flesh, tabooed, is shameful, although we lack accounts of the dis-grace of male 
flesh. Ringrose and Renolds (2016, p. 228) report how the functionality of female teenage 
girls’ legs is over-written by shame and humiliation in their ‘becoming-meat” (p.228). 
The performativity of time (Barad, 2007) renders another part of the female anatomy 
shameful: her arms. The narrator writes that her ‘fleshy batwings’ and ‘wobbly biceps 
and triceps’ are disgraceful. Body/flesh will undo her, she fears, turning her into a crone, 
an historical assemblage that renders older women invisible, irrelevant, burdensome and 
unwelcome in workplaces. This is her conscious thought. The language not to hand at 
that time arrived only during our discussions, difficult but also full of laughter invoked by 
breaking a taboo through discussing it. The Consultant therefore tells that women’s (and, 
we posit, men’s) body/flesh is matter out of place in organizations. Body/flesh is animal, 
is meat, is irrational, can undo us through its desires (Angel, 2014).  Body/flesh is messy: 
it must be denied and controlled (Riach & Warren, 2015). Body/flesh has smells, liquid 
and solid matter, shit, urine, menstrual blood, leakages, gases, messes and smells: these 
words are mimetic of material body/flesh itself; both corporeal matter and words shock 
when appearing in public space.  
The Consultant deliberately, will-fully, strove to prevent eruptions of body/flesh into that 
organizational encounter. Shame and embarrassment are control mechanisms (Butler, 
1997), necessitating the Consultant’s hard, panicky work to keep body/flesh invisible. 
The Consultant’s account illuminates how taboo body/flesh requires strict control, but 
also how control of body/flesh is performative: it limits what forms the corporealizing, 
embodied working subject can take.  

































































Our analysis so far suggests body/flesh is the stepping-off point for becoming an ‘I’, but 
that ‘I’ both controls and is controlled by body/flesh. The remaining vignette reveals 
body/flesh as judge and jailer. 
The Autoethnographer’s brief liberation from norms governing female body/flesh
I am wearing boxing gloves and being ordered by a small, young woman to thump the 
padded target she is holding. ‘Harder’, she shouts, ‘harder’.  I am in the gym making 
weak little upper cuts.  My trainer tires of my efforts and shows me what to do. I have to 
raise my fist to my shoulder and thrust it out, hard, over-arm.  Suddenly my fist hits the 
target with a loud ‘thump’.  Over and over, thump, thump, thump. It is exhilarating. I am 
laughing. My trainer is laughing with me, encouraging me to ever harder punches. I am, 
I realize, ‘thumping like a man’. In the changing room later, reflecting on the 
exhilaration of the experience, I remembered an episode in my early adolescence that 
puzzled me at the time. I’d been on a rare trip with my mother, aunt and sister to Cardiff, 
to see the Queen, or perhaps it was the Dead Sea Scrolls.  On the journey home, my sister 
and I had run to sit on the long front seat of the bus where we sat with our backs to the 
engine, in contrast to the other seats that all faced forwards. My mother had given me 
direct instructions (Mother: ‘sit with your legs closed’; Daughter: ‘but why? It’s not 
comfortable’). That was my first conscious lesson in having to control my body.  
The Autoethnographer recalls an incident from an auto-ethnographic study of how older 
women work on body/flesh. As discussed in the methodology (above) in one round of 
data analysis we drew on Barad’s license to use anthropomorphism, or the attribution of 
sentience to phenomena otherwise deemed to be non-sentient, to construct dramas in 

































































which we imagined what non-sentient objects would say if they could speak. Here is that 
imagined play based on the Autoethnographer’s account. 
The furniture: I foster different ways of sitting, and different ways of comporting bodies;
The bus seat: I made the child sit facing the gaze of the other passengers. I dictated where 
its body should fold itself into a sitting position. 
The child: I was told to sit without spreading my body or taking up space;
The mother (now long-dead): the passengers would be gazing at my child: I had to induct 
her into conformity with unwritten norms I only knew half-consciously myself. 
The boxing gloves: I shook my wearer out of long-upheld ways of doing her body, and 
sent her on a journey into a past that takes on a particular significance in the present’. 
We introduced Barad into the play.  
Barad: the non-sentient objects are an apparatus, or a specific material-discursive practice 
that produces differences that matter. They are phenomena, i.e. material 
re/con/figurations of both spatiality and temporality (Barad, 2007, p. 146).  
Even Lacan may have intervened, perhaps from the wings: the reconfiguring of 
temporality can be summed up as ‘what is realized in my history is not the past definite of 
what was, since it is no more, or even the present perfect of what has been in what I am, 
but the future anterior of what I shall have been for what I am in the process of 
becoming." (Lacan, 1977, p. 86)
The analysis required interpretation of this imagined play. We started with Lacan’s 
contrasting verb tenses: these suggest memories are concerned not so much with 
remembering as with the constitution of the self in that moment of telling (Barzilai, 
1999). This ‘I’, thrown back into its history through the agency of non-sentient objects 

































































projects itself forward into a future where it says ‘this is how I learned to become aware 
of the norms that govern female embodiment’. We revisited Butler’s analysis of norms - 
norms ‘are enacted (at least in part) through the gaze: one must be ‘seen’ to be 
conforming within them’ (Butler, 1990). Norms call into being the internalised judges 
who police them (Foucault, 1975; Butler, 1990). This returned us to familiar 
understanding of the performative constitution of the gendered self through conformity 
within gender norms (Butler, 1990; 1993). Was there nothing more to say?
We found insight in the future anterior of that remembered child who moved from the 
female space with the mother into traditionally masculine territory. Boxing is a sport 
underpinned by a hypermasculine ethos (Wacquant, 2014). Occupancy of this masculine 
space made palpable the author’s awareness of being gendered as female. Required to 
wear boxing gloves, ordered to use them in ways that necessitated traducing learned 
bodily norms, gloves’ and gym’s agency were together strong enough to shatter the half-
known rules practised since childhood, bringing conscious awareness of throwing 
[punches] like a girl (Young, 1980).  But why such jubilation at breaking the boundaries 
of norms governing female corporeality? 
Baradian agential realism offered an answer. The Autoethnographer’s body is not the 
(Cartesian) vehicle that carries the Autoethnographer into fieldwork: it is of the field, part 
of its on-going reconfiguring (Barad, 2007, p.168). We had occasion above to draw on 
Butler’s (2015) observation of how, through Nachträglichkeit or reliving the past in the 
present, the agential cut (Barad, 2007) between past and present dissolves. This vignette 
illustrated how norms impressed upon body/flesh in ‘the past’ govern its comportment in 
‘the present’. This illuminates how corporealizing working body/flesh is engaged in 

































































helter-skelter, time-travelling journeys where the past is very present in the present. In 
other words, body/flesh is a recording device that contains instructions, learned in 
childhood, of how to comport itself. 
The Autoethnographer’s exultation in transgressing those norms thus suggests body/flesh 
is a jail one does not know one is in until suddenly one is freed. Body/flesh is also the 
warder patrolling that jail. That is, a culture’s norms are impressed upon body/flesh in 
infancy (Butler, 2015) and body/flesh transmits those norms, requiring our half-aware 
obeisance to them. Body/flesh thus polices body/flesh, judging any transgressions, 
punishing them with electric charges of shame. Body/flesh is arresting officer, judge and 
jailer.  
Discussion and Conclusion
Our analysis collapses body (cultural) and flesh (material/biological) into body/flesh, thus 
disavowing an arbitrary agentive cut that attempted to separate an indivisible whole into 
parts. It illuminates how body/flesh is the point of departure for sentience. Body/flesh can 
move, absent any mind, the self returned in some ways to the original infantile state of 
undifferentiation (not yet aware of its individuality and its body/flesh), until it is shocked 
back into that sense of a self re-cognized as me.  With sentience comes requirement to 
conform with half-apprehended norms (that is, we know how we must behave but are not 
consciously aware of the laws that require such behaviour). Amongst the norms are those 
that state body/flesh is taboo in organizations – if body/flesh makes itself apparent a norm 
is transgressed and the discomfort of embarrassment follows. Body/flesh must therefore 
be controlled – kept silent and invisible. Its eruptions cannot be spoken of except perhaps 

































































in jest1, laughter sometimes disguising body/flesh’s power to shame and undo 
organizational subjects. That very requirement for control, becomes, in a classic Butlerian 
reversal, itself a means of control, because if body/flesh requires monitoring and 
guarding, then we must expend time and energy undertaking those tasks and monitor 
ourselves in the acts of monitoring. Indeed, body/flesh demands hyper-alertness, if one is 
not to be betrayed by its unruly wants as Angel (2014) writes of desire, which runs 
riotously through women’s ‘unruly, lustful’ bodies, whose ‘unbridled, guilty febrility’ (p. 
200) must be ‘hacked at the root’. Body/flesh, we showed, is judge (if we transgress the 
rules of embodiment the punishment is shame and embarrassment), jury (if found guilty 
we are infused with shame) and warder (monitor of our success at controlling 
body/flesh’s desires and eruptions). We are jailed by body/flesh; imprisoned ‘within’ it 
we must obey those rules that are impressed within and upon it. At the same time 
body/flesh is vital to existence: there can be no sentient subject that is not enfleshed. 
What, then, is this body/flesh with such powers? The substantial literature on bodies and 
embodiment in MOS provides few answers: flesh, by which we mean the very material of 
the body, is under-examined (Boncori et al 2019). Grosz (1995, in Styhre, 2005, p.104) 
observed that ‘Analyses of the representation of bodies abound, but bodies in their 
material variety still wait to be thought’. Substituting body/flesh or ‘carnal materiality’ 
for ‘material variety’ perhaps makes clearer what our study suggests: flesh needs to be 
understood not as ‘the body’ but as that which is both prior and co-constitutive of ‘the 
body’ that becomes organized into ‘embodiment’.  Styhre’s (2005) review of bodies in 
1 For a joyful analysis of one such eruption, see Travis’ (2004) analysis of the fart’s 
power as a political sign.  (Travis, P. (2004). Thirteen ways of listening to a fart: noise in 
Chaucer’s Summoner’s Tale. Exemplaria, 16:2, 323-348.)

































































organization theory showed that in our discipline corporeality is ‘reduced … to a texture, 
a discursive formation that can be interpreted, decoded and examined as such’ (p. 111). 
‘Flesh’s’ carnal materiality here remains invisible. Our study illuminates how discourses 
are imposed upon bodies, but bodies only make sense if that ignored, tabooed flesh is 
reinstated within language. Gartner’s (2013) later review of much of MOS’s ‘substantial’ 
literature indicates its haunting by Cartesian dualism, but, again, ‘flesh’ appears only in 
the title of that review paper, the carnality of bodies remaining undefined and 
unexamined. Most rec ntly, Yates, Riach and Johansson (2018) show that the literature 
on the corporeal in MOS still tends to focus on perceptible or otherwise ‘available’ 
aspects of embodiment such as comportment or pain. At the same time, carnality is there 
in many of these accounts, but unaddressed, hidden behind bodies. 
In sum, if regarded empirically, humans are carnal, material, enfleshed subjects; but if 
regarded theoretically then flesh eludes understanding, always exceeding the boundaries 
of representation (Butler, 2015). Bodies know through sensing, and through what is 
inscribed within/on/as flesh, and that knowledge may not be available in language (op 
cit). However, our study, in peering intensely into the moment-to-moment moves of the 
performative, both identifies that moment in which indescribable flesh becomes 
articulable body and collapses this arbitrary distinction into body/flesh. 
To make sense of this, and thus to understand the agency of body/flesh in the 
performative corporealizing of the working self, we returned to our diffractive reading of 
Butler and Barad, reading their insights productively within and through each other. The 
first task was to reverse the title of Butler’s book ‘Bodies that Matter’ to describe the 
puzzle we are exploring, that is ‘Matter that Bodies’. This recognizes, but at the same 

































































time helps resolve, Barad’s (2007) accusation of Butler’s work that it re-inscribes matter 
as a passive product of discursive practices, with only the body’s contours, rather than its 
fleshy materiality, its body/flesh, emerging. To understand how matter ‘bodies’, we 
develop a model that uses Barad’s recognition of matter’s dynamism and the agential cut 
that instigates bodily boundaries, and Butler’s extension of Althusser’s theory of 
interpellation to explain the operation of the agential cut. This allows us to peer more 
deeply into the moment-to-moment movement of the performative that can be seen in our 
empirical materials.   
Barad (2007, p.155) notes science’s dismantling of what appear to be bodily boundaries: 
they are culturally and historically specific. Bodies are thus ‘phenomena that acquire 
specific boundaries and properties through the open-ended dynamics of intra-activity’ 
(Barad, 2007, p.172). Humans, and bodies, are part of the ongoing reconfiguring of the 
world, that is, emergent phenomena that, like all other physical systems, emerge through 
agential cuts that enact boundaries, properties, and meanings (P. 340). ‘Flesh’ in Barad’s 
terms is ‘matter’, that is, an undifferentiated mass awaiting an agential cut that delineates 
bodies as seemingly discrete entities having seemingly discrete limbs, organs, skeleton, 
neurological, digestive, reproductive and other systems. 
What enables an agential cut? Barad’s focus is on laboratories, and on measurement, 
something not so immediately apparent in the everyday world of work, but there is a clue 
in her emphasis on apparatus’ agency in making agential cuts: the ‘crucial point’ is ‘that 
the apparatus enacts an agential cut – a resolution of the ontological indeterminacy – 
within the phenomenon’ (2007, p.159). ‘Apparatuses’ are discursive practices, i.e. 
‘specific material reconfigurings through which “objects” and “subjects” are produced 

































































(p.148). What discursive practices/apparatuses operated within our vignettes to enact that 
agential cut? Butler (1997) offers a way of identifying apparatuses in the act of making 
the agential cut through which body/flesh becomes demarcated as ‘my’ working body 
separate and distinct from flesh-in-itself, in her extension (1997) of Althusser’s (1971) 
theory of interpellation. 
Althusser’s famous theory of subjectivity involves a mythical scene of a police officer 
calling out to an innocent passer-by, ‘hey you’. The person, in turning to respond, 
identifies itself as a criminal. Butler (1997) asked: but who is it that precedes that call? 
There is no-one, she answered. Our study shows that that no-one is the flesh-in-itself of 
body/flesh. That is, absent-minded, non-self-aware matter that is vital for the emergence 
of a human awaits the interpellative hail. Butler helps illuminate the complex process that 
occurs in the momentary act of bare matter’s turning towards that voice. Prior to the call 
there is no subject, only body/flesh. The call is heard, body/flesh turns, and in the very act 
of turning becomes an embodied subject with an identity, who is subject to the norms and 
laws governing behaviours.  The figure of the police officer in this foundational scene is 
no accident; Butler uses it to illuminate how the subject that emerges is not only 
consciously aware of itself, but is also imbued with the powerful restrictions of a 
conscience. That is, body/flesh, hailed, turns and a subject becomes inaugurated, 
subjected and subjectified.
In other words, Butler brings to Baradian theory an alternative boundary-making 
apparatus: the interpellative call/apparatus is both ‘discursive practice’ and ‘specific 
material (re)configuration of the world through which the determination of boundaries, 

































































properties, and meanings is differentially enacted’ (Barad, 2007, p.148), that allows ‘a 
genealogical analysis of the material-discursive emergence of the human’ (p. 150). 
We saw such apparatuses in our empirical materials, when body/flesh materialized as ‘my 
(gendered) body’: the interpellative call was heard and agential cut made, as we now 
briefly summarise. 
The ethnographer’s account introduced agentive body/flesh, moving without conscious 
thought, until she was plummeted into conscious awareness of a self through, at the 
beginning of the week, an invasion of noisy young men into her space, and a glance in the 
mirror at the week’s end. Those young men, even without speaking or getting physically 
close to her reached out and through the power of affect touched her. They, in effect, 
called, ‘hey you there’. That interpellative hail is (as posthuman theory argues of 
discourses) material: the sound of the call touches body/flesh, wraps it in its embrace and 
turns it around, subjectivity coursing through body/flesh as it completes the turn. 
Body/flesh, in that moment of turning, becomes cultural, corporealized ‘I’. The mirror at 
the week’s end performs a similar call, but now it imposes gender. That is, body/flesh is 
prior to gender: gender is imposed on it later, only after the interpellative hail: ‘hey you, 
you woman’. 
The Consultant, on the other hand, attempted to negate body/flesh, to keep it hidden, but 
it insisted on its presence, requiring that she struggle with it.  The interpellative hail here 
comes from body/flesh itself, but now it is not calling the self into mind-ful existence but 
into the norms that govern the constitution of working (professional) embodied selves. As 
Butler’s (1997, p.118) exposition of the interpellative turn observes, ‘To become a 
“subject” is...to have been presumed guilty, then tried and declared innocent. Because this 

































































declaration is not a single act but a status incessantly reproduced, to become a “subject” 
is to be continually acquitting oneself of the accusation of guilt’. If body/flesh is taboo 
then any emanation marks one as guilty, and the Consultant illuminates the panic that 
ensues as body/flesh calls out, using perspiration as its language, ‘hey you, you with the 
body’. The prospect of breaking the taboo looms. The interpellative hail, as Baradian 
agential cut-making apparatus, is imbued with power: it not only makes matter into 
(gendered) bodies in the act of turning, it infuses body/flesh with sensations, requiring 
that sensations that inform working body/flesh are restrictive, uncomfortable, painful. 
Body/flesh is not something that can be enjoyed while at work, or perhaps it is office-
bound body/flesh that cannot be enjoyed (the footballers who invaded the Ethnographer’s 
space may offer a different reading).
Finally, we identify the interpellative hail in the Autoethnographer’s account as that made 
by the trainer: ‘punch harder’ – ‘hey you, see what might happen when you break out of 
gender’s jail’. This offers an alternative reading to interpellation: there may be ways out 
of rather than into jail in the turn. The jubilation of breaking free of the norms within 
which she manifested and policed body/flesh, that turned it into a jail, the self into judge, 
jury and warder, lasted only momentarily, but it happened. This points towards the 
possibility of interceding in the interpellative turn to refuse the police officer’s hail, and 
thus to resist entry into the norms that await one as the turn is completed.  Body/flesh 
turns, becoming perhaps rebellious, pleasurable, sybaritic, demanding it experiences 
embodiment differently. We cannot envisage these possibilities – we are too socialized 
into the norms of our academic profession – but the opportunity exists for exploration – 
from disciplined to sybaritic body/flesh perhaps.

































































To conclude briefly (for organizational limitations on the becoming flesh/body are 
replicated in the strict word limits on journal papers), we aimed to make two 
contributions in this paper. The first, to explore the performative constitution of 
corporeal(izing) working bodies, has introduced an understanding of flesh as the matter 
through which bodies become constituted as body/flesh. Body/flesh resists the arbitrary 
cut between flesh (corporeal matter) and body (the corporeal substance on which culture 
is stamped). It (and thus gender) is prior to what we apprehend as ‘bodies’. This points 
towards possibilities of different constitutions of working body/flesh. Secondly, we read 
Butlerian and Baradian theories of performativity within and through each other, using 
body/flesh’s materiality in the performative moment to illustrate the power that can come 
from reconciling their perspectives. 
Much more can be done both theoretically and empirically. Of the former, our diffractive 
reading of the works of two powerful intellects, Butler and Barad, offers possibilities for 
further development. Empirically, we offer a methodology for exploring the 
materialization of body/flesh in other contexts and with different subjects. How this can 
be done remains to be explored, but the possibilities are exciting.  
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